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THE MEXICAN CRISIS: WHO SHOULD BE A
COUNTRYS LENDER OF LAST RESORT?
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein*
It is possible to view today's Mexican peso crisis as once
again proving that there is nothing new under the sun. In 1870,
Walter Bagehot, then editor of the Economist, wrote a "little"
book on the money market of England, advising the Bank of
England, on how to deal with both domestic panics (lend) and
foreign capital flight (raise the bank rate).' Bagehot could not
have imagined imposing exchange controls as England would
have immediately ceased to be the commercial center of the
world.
After World War II, the same nations that met in San Fran-
cisco to try to prevent the use of force for the resolution of con-
flict met at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire to try to ensure
that nations should never again resort to trade-devastating ex-
change controls to try to deal with monetary disorder. Those
arrangements, including the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") Agreement,' in addition to providing for multilateral
oversight of exchange controls and encouragement of a return
to convertibility of currencies, set up a pool of currencies to
which a country experiencing an exchange crisis could turn.
However, in contradistinction to Bagehot's advice for bank runs
- to restore confidence by providing liquidity, lots of it, imme-
diately - Fund aid from the pool took, and takes, a considera-
ble period of time to negotiate between the needy country in
crisis and the other countries represented on the Board of the
Fund. Thus, since 1945, international monetary history has seen
a number of interim rescues, providing temporary liquidity to
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the country in crisis until the longer term aid from the Fund (or
other forms of restructuring) can be worked out. The interim
rescues have been orchestrated by the central banks of the in-
dustrialized nations, orchestrated without a formal legal struc-
ture, but with a gentleman's agreement that the amount to be
contributed by each to any such rescue will be agreed on a case-
by-case basis.'
Even the fact that the latest major U.S. trading partner to be
involved in an exchange crisis is Mexico is not new. Recall that it
was only in 1982 that there was a "rescue" of Mexico led by the
United States when the then Mexican Finance Minister came to
Washington and revealed that Mexico would be unable to repay
to the private international banking consortiums from which it
had borrowed the dollar obligations then due. At that time, the
possibility of letting a major Latin ally with whom the United
States shares a 3000 mile border "default" was regarded as im-
possible. Temporary short term financing, both from United
States agencies and from the BIS central banks, was arranged
literally overnight.4 The financing restored liquidity until the
private banks could be persuaded by the international commu-
nity and, especially, by the International Monetary Fund and by
the U.S. Treasury to reschedule their loans so as to give the Mex-
ican economy additional time to cope with its indebtedness.
This particular story was then followed by, a number of other
Latin American countries, with the entire episode being called
the "Latin debt crisis."' It may also be recalled that Mexico was
the first of the countries so indebted to international banks to be
able to grow its way out of the debt and to return to the private
capital markets. Thus, Mexico has been touted as the "golden
boy" of economic reform, structural readjustment, and privatiza-
3. The industrialized countries, the so-called G-10, have been meeting regularly to
discuss international monetary cooperation since the early 1960's at the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements in Basle. Since that time, rescues have been quietly coordinated
from there. For a history of such rescues by a Treasury official involved often in the
Basle meetings, see P. LisLE WiDmAN, MAKING INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY (1983)
and RICHARD W. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION (1985).
4. Congressional hearings held subsequently provide the best source of informa-
tion on how the U.S. financed its portion of the rescue. For authority on the BIS cen-
tral banks' participation, see DEANE & PRINGLE, THE CENTRAL BANIS 104 (1994).
5. For a history of the debt crisis up to 1994, see LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL MON-
ETARY IAw (2d ed. 1984). For the U.S. response to its private banks' participation in the
lending, see Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The US. Response to the International Debt Cisis: The
Internationai Lending Supevision Act of 1983, 25 VIRG. J. OF INT'L L. 401 (1984).
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tion 6 in the new economy of the 1990's.
Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences be-
tween this Mexican debt crisis and the events of 1982. First and
foremost, the 1982 crisis, as all post-World War II developed
country or newly industrialized country exchange crises, was
handled quickly and without large amounts of media attention
through use of diplomacy and short term "bridge" multilateral
aid.' As noted above, the 1982 Mexican rescue not only involved
bridge loans from the G-10 central banks, but the U.S. Treasury
Department rounded up the lion's share of the moneys neces-
sary to tide Mexico over until the IMF loan and the bank
reschedulings could be put in place by utilizing a combination of
Federal Reserve Bank swaps, the Exchange Stabilization Fund,
and the interesting device of prepaying to Mexico the Defense
Department purchases of oil for oil stockpiling. The real point
here, however, is that the whole package was put together virtu-
ally overnight.
In contrast, in December 1994, when Mexico once again
faced the prospect of default, this time on government obliga-
tions that it had issued on the capital markets and that were pay-
able in dollars, the Clinton Administration announced a US$40
billion program of guarantees for which it determined it would
need congressional approval. The markets were hardly calmed
by the news that a rescue would be mounted if both Houses of
the U.S. Congress voted in favor. The process of "rescue" was
delayed into February when, finally realizing that the congres-
sional approval might not be forthcoming, the Clinton Adminis-
tration "organized" and announced on January 31 to the media
a multilateral rescue to which the United States would contrib-
ute the US$20 billion the executive could scrape up without con-
gressional approval. The Clinton Administration also bludg-
eoned the International Monetary Fund into announcing a
standby credit to Mexico of an unprecedented amount (600 per-
cent of Mexico's quota) and persuaded the central bank part-
ners in the BIS to increase the previously agreed upon contribu-
tion of US$5 billion to US$10 billion.' Last, the signing on Feb-
6. See Anthony DePalma, U.S. Aid Plan Is Hardly a Cure-all, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1995, at D5.
7. See supra note 3.
8. For a complete description of the process - or lack of process, as the case may
be - by which the G-10 central banks and the IMF were folded into the eventual rescue
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ruary 21 of the actual accord between Mexico and the United
States for the newly-coordinated rescue was so delayed that a
member of the Mexican Finance Ministry announced that the
original Mexican plan for restructuring could no longer be con-
sidered viable because the situation had changed considerably
since December.9 As this is being written, the signing of the ac-
cord seems to have calmed the markets, and the peso is no
longer in freefall, but it is not possible for anyone to say whether
or not the promised US$50 billion will in fact buy time for Mex-
ico to put its economic house in order.
Is the present lack of confidence in Mexico's capacity to
stand up and walk again due solely to these delays? Presumably
not. It is possible also to distinguish the handling of this Mexi-
can exchange crisis in two other ways. In 1982, while Mexico was
able to not default on its private bank borrowing, it did stem the
excruciating outflow of capital by the immediate imposition of
exchange controls. 10 For Mexico, which had always prided itself
on the convertiblity of the peso, the imposition of the exchange
controls was at that time an innovation. The banking system was
also temporarily nationalized. Here it must be noted that under
the international rules of the game for exchange controls, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund Agreement, the imposition of exchange
controls to deal with a temporary exchange crisis is permissi-
ble." If the exchange controls are imposed on capital move-
ments, the Fund Agreement does not apply in the first place and
members of the Fund are free, in the legal sense (unless other-
wise restricted by other treaty obligations), to restrict capital
flows into and out of the country in their discretion. 12 If the
controls to deal with the crisis are imposed on exchange for what
are called "current transactions" (roughly, exchange for trade in
goods or services), then the Fund's approval must be received,'"
package, see George Graham et al., Mexican Rescue: Bitter Legacy of Battle to Bail Out
Mexico, FIN'L TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at 4 [hereinafter Mexican Rescue]. See also Douglas
Jehi, Mexican Rescue Plan: A Chronology; Slow Building Despair Led to Decision on Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at 16A.
9. Anthony DePalma, Economy Reeling: Mexicans Prepare Tough New Steps, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1995, at 1A.
10. Stephen T. Zamora, Peso-Dollar Economics and the Imposition of Foreign Exchange
Controls in Mexico, 32 AM.J. COMp. L. 99 (1984).
11. I.M.F. Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, 60 Stat. at 1403, 3 Bevans at 1354.
12. Id. art. VI, § 3.
13. Id. art. VIII, § 2(a).
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but the country, working on its crisis, has access to the resources
of the Fund. The International Monetary Fund is the interna-
tionally agreed-upon multilateral method of providing aid to na-
tions in temporary exchange crises. Because the Fund's aid is
always conditioned on economic reform, it is not possible for the
Fund to extend bridging loans and to act immediately. In the
case of this Mexican crisis, Mexico had been negotiating with the
Fund on the terms of a standby arrangement, as the Fund's aid is
called, and the Fund had already agreed on conditions as usual
to US$7.9 billion. The additional US$10.8 billion that was
agreed to the night of January 3114 was presumably provided on
the same conditions. It is not at all unusual for the Fund, in
working with a country in distress for the extension of a standby
arrangement, to agree that the country may deal with its
problems by imposing temporary exchange controls.
Why exchange controls were not imposed by Mexico in this
latest crisis so as to allow the country to allow some breathing
space while putting its economic house in order is related di-
rectly to the third reason why the handling of this exchange cri-
sis has been so different. An "exchange crisis" for any country
(other than a country whose own currency is used as what is
called a reserve currency) simply means not having the reserves
available in hard currencies or gold, the original reserve, to ex-
change for its own currency upon demand. That is the meaning
of "convertiblity": when foreign holders of the country's cur-
rency, the peso, demand the exchange of their holdings for a
hard currency, the government either must convert those hold-
ings or impose exchange controls to ration the outflow from its
Treasury of its own holdings of reserve currencies. Although re-
serve currencies are not only the means by which countries sup-
port the value of their own currency, they are often the only cur-
rencies that sellers to the country of the goods and services that
the country needs to import to support its growth or to a bur-
geoning middle class deriving imported goods will accept. Now
for any country (again, other than a country whose own currency
is a reserve currency), the only ways to obtain hard currency are
to earn it by exports, to borrow it from a multilateral institution
14. George Graham & Stephen Fidler, Europeans Angry at United States over Mexico:
Finance Officials Set to Berate Rubin for Lack of Consultation on Rescue Package, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1995, at 3.
.19951 1773
1774 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1769
such as the World Bank or the Fund, to borrow it from private
banks as a number of countries did in the 1970's (and indeed
are doing again), or finally, to get it from foreign investors,
either in the form of "direct" investment or "portfolio" invest-
ment. "Portfolio" investment is today obtained by those coun-
tries, such as Mexico, that have access to the capital markets,
either by issuing government bonds denominated in or linked to
the hard currency'5 or to encourage in these changing times for-
eign equity mutual funds to purchase shares in privatized indus-
try in the country.
It must also be noted, however - and this again is a big
difference of this Mexican exchange crisis from 1982 - that get-
ting access to hard currencies through portfolio investment in
the securities of a country needing reserves has very different
consequences for the country from either attracting foreign di-
rect investment or even borrowing hard currencies from foreign
private banks. Direct investment is not "hot money." It is not
possible for direct foreign investors to sell a plant in an ex-
change market. Equally, foreign banks, while they may sell the
asset or even trade in the obligations of countries on their own,
cannot demand payment on the loan before it is due. Moreover,
foreign banks are, as they were in 1982, subject to governmental
pressure to reschedule in the interest of preserving the ally in
difficulty. (Indeed in the ultimate longer term rescue plans for
the Latin countries, the banks were "persuaded" to put in new
money.) This is not the case with the mutual fund and the insti-
tutional investor. If the global bond fund or the equity emerg-
ing markets fund manager determines that, say, Mexico no
longer seems able to add performance to the fund or even will
substantially detract, the tesobonos in the bond fund are
dumped on the market as are the shares of Mexican companies.
If the selling fund sells the bonds or shares for pesos, it demands
convertibility of those pesos from, ultimately, the country's cen-
tral bank and the country's reserves flow out as quickly as they
were added to by the portfolio investors. Mexico, with its "mirac-
ulous" recovery since 1982 and return to the capital markets,
had depended upon these investors for its hard currency; in-
15. These bonds will either be long term or short term Treasury obligations, de-
pending on what the market will accept. Mexico, unfortunately, had recently come to
rely heavily on "tesobonos," which are short term obligations tied to the dollar.
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deed, one of the methods of attracting these investors was the
promise of convertibility and the "fixed" exchange rate of the
peso against the dollar.
Why then did Mexico not treat these sudden outflows as
they treated in 1982 the dollar deposits in Mexican banks? Be-
cause to do so would violate the new rules of the game' 6 of what
Chairman Greenspan of the Federal Reserve has referred to as
"the internationalized capital markets." The possibility that one
might impose exchange controls precludes one from access to
these capital markets because the last thing that any mutual fund
manager can tolerate is the possibility that he or she might not
be able to quickly dump a holding and shift elsewhere.
Now we come to the heart of the matter. The International
Monetary Fund was originally set up to ensure that exchange dif-
ficulties on the part of member nations did not cause the imposi-
tion of exchange controls on what is called in the Fund Agree-
ment, rather quaintly, "current transactions," but which means
essentially payments for trade. The Fund never set any rules of
the game for exchange controls for capital outflows and indeed
the Fund Agreement provides that its resources shall not be used
to sustain capital outflows.17 The view has been in the past that
investors should take care of themselves. While a country's ac-
cess to capital markets will be limited by the use of exchange
controls and while, all other things being equal, it is desirable to
have freedom of capital movements, even the complete liberali-
zation of capital movements in the European Union has a provi-
sion' 8 allowing each of the Member States to impose, in the
event of an exchange crisis, exchange controls temporarily with
the concurrence of a monitor. So from the multilateral point of
view, the fact that Mexico had misjudged its capacity to fix the
16. These "rules" are not, unlike the Treaty obligations in the Fund Agreement,
international legal obligations. They are only the supposed "law" of the capital markets,
or capital jungle, depending on your viewpoint. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, New
Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at 25A.
17. I.M.F. Agreement, supra note 2, art. VI, § 1(a), 60 Stat. at 1409, 3 Bevans at
1360.
18. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, § 109h, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573, 650, incorporating changes made ly Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,
1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU].
The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), as
amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, in TREA.
mEs ESTABLISHNc THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987)).
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peso and to continue to pay out its reserves on demand at that
dollar-peso rate would not be a matter of international concern.
But, one might rejoin, why was the possibility that Mexico in
1982 might default on its loans to the private international banks
a matter of international concern? In 1982, given the lack of
capital of at least the U.S. major money center banks, the banks
would have put at risk the entire international financial system if
they were themselves to be rendered insolvent by the default of
their Latin lending, which so much exceeded their capital.
Hence the international community had an enormous interest
in resolving the Latin debt crisis. How that crisis was resolved is
far too long a story to tell here, but there seems to have been at
no time any significant disagreement among the G-10 as to the
necessity of a resolution to the crisis.
In the case of the present Mexican crisis, that multilateral
consensus was and is lacking. The final great difference from
1982 in the handling of this Mexican crisis is the lack of agree-
ment among the G-10 as to the necessity for the rescue. From
the point of view of the United States, it may be a geo-political
and strategic necessity for the United States to rescue Mexico.
Certain members of the G-10, however, in particular Germany
and the United Kingdom according to press accounts, 19 were
not convinced that the imposition of exchange controls and the
refusal to convert pesos to allow the foreign institutional inves-
tors to take their capital out of Mexico would represent a risk, so-
called "systemic," to the international financial system. The U.S.
Treasury disagreed and seems to have believed that Mexican de-
fault on its tesobonos and unilateral promise of convertibility for
capital outflow would threaten the financial system. Certainly
such a default would lead to a breakdown of the new interna-
tional capital markets, particularly many of the newly-emerging
capital markets and their countries' access to foreign exchange
through portfolio investment. In short, from the U.S. point of
view, failure of Mexico at this time would be failure of economic
reform and the miracle of the return of the Latin countries to
the capital markets.
The problem is, however, that if that is the way the United
19. See Mexican Rescue, supra note 8, at 4; George Graham & Stephen Fidler, Europe-
ans Angry at United States over Mexico: Finance Officials Set to Berate Ruben for Lack of Consul-
tation on Rescue Package, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1995, at 3.
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States saw the issues, the United States should, in the view of the
allies, have acted on its own. But the United States could not act
on its own. Congress was not about to vote the funds necessary
to restore investors' confidence in Mexico. So it would seem
that the United States strong-armed its allies and the Fund into
putting together the new package. The allies, however, indi-
cated their displeasure by doing something unprecedented. In-
ternational Monetary Fund lending has always been approved by
consensus. This time, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom abstained on the
vote.2 0 As for the participation of the central banks under the
BIS umbrella, they too went along, because President Clinton in
his press announcement had proclaimed that they would partici-
pate to the extent of US$10 billion in the package. But as the
Financial Times reports and an unnamed Finance Minister re-
marked, "it must not happen again."21
We do not know the end of the story of this Mexican crisis.
But we do know the lesson of the particular handling of this par-
ticular "international" rescue. If newly industrializing countries
like Mexico are to depend for a portion of their reserves upon
access to global bond and equity mutual funds, then there must
be a multilateral rethinking of the multilateral response to ex-
change crises in such countries. If, in this new world of open
capital markets, countries depend for their inflows of capital
upon these markets, and if crises arise, who and by what institu-
tional processes is to make the decision that a multinational, or
multilateral institution, rescue should be mounted? It would
seem to be the firm intention of the G-7 at the economic summit
in Halifax, Nova Scotia this coming June to begin to address this
question in this new global financial world.22 It is a question of
the utmost importance to capital importing countries.
20. Id.
21. See Mexican Rescue, supra note 8, at 4.
22. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Personal View: Mexican Precedent for Ukraine, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 17,
1995, at 17; David E. Sanger, Struggle to Deal with a $20 Billion Precedent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1995, at ID.
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